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VOLUME XVI FEBRUARY, 1931 NUMBER 2
PUBLIC ESTHETICS AND THE BILLBOARD
HENRY W. PROFFITT*
The romance of "the skin you love to touch", the story of the dis-
criminating gentleman who "walked a mile" for a cigarette, the epic
of that "good 5 cent cigar", the tale of the medicine that "children
cry for", the flaming vision of those innumerable products of Ameri-
can manufacture and commerce so prominently displayed on bill-
boards, are daily thrust upon the traveling public, whether it likes it
or not. The motorist is met at every turn by the ubiquitous billboard;
he is exhorted to "reach for a Lucky instead of a sweet", to "keep
that school-girl complexion", to insist on the breakfast food that is
"shot from guns", to consume "hot-dogs" and "hamburgers", and
to stop at all the "biggest and finest hotels."
The country is over-run with a vast .and heterogeneous collection
of billboards, most of which are of surpassing ugliness and many of
which appear to have been designedly located for the express pur-
pose of despoiling the scenic beauty of the country-side.
In actual fact, the great majority of these advertising structures
cannot be said to endanger the health, morals or safety of the public.
They might continue to be used, increase and multiply, and the public
would not thereby be exposed to any real danger. The complaint
against the billboards on the part of that growing body of people who
are laboring for their suppression is simply-"We don't like them."
The insistent demand for reform is evidenced by the many so-
cieties which have been organized and have conducted campaigns of
education in an effort to foster in the general public, higher civic
ideals, and finer esthetic sensibilities. The support of garden clubs,
civic societies, national, state, and local bodies has been enlisted, and
it is doubtless due in large measure to these efforts that the esthetic
tastes of the public appear gradually to be undergoing a refining
development.
With a realization, however, that something more potent than an
educational campaign was necessary if the "billboard nuisance" was
to be held in check, strenuous efforts have been made during the past
*Member of the Bar Association of the City of New York, and of the New
York State Bar Association.
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decade to obtain legislation on the subject and, as shall be pointed
out in this paper, such efforts have met with substantial success.
The principle that unsightly advertisements as such should be sub-
ject to governmental restriction and regulation is not novel. The
courts have found no difficulty in restraining offensive noises and
odors. A similar protection to the eye would not establish a new
principle, but would merely carry a recognized principle to further
applications.
Just how far the courts and law-making bodies should go in the
regulation of billboard advertising is a question on which opinions
will differ widely. The extreme view of the billboard enemies is that
such structures are unsightly even under the best circumstances and
should be entirely prohibited by law. On the other hand, there are
those who are alarmed at the mass of laws which are annually added
to our already-crowded statute books, and who say that we have a
chronic mania for regulating other people's affairs by law and we
should discourage the notion that nearly every problem, whether
social, economic or political, is solved and disposed of by passing a
law about it.
Whether, from the viewpoint of political science, the regulation of
billboards as such is properly within the scope of legislative activity
is a question with which we are not here concerned. Rather, we are
concerned with a consideration of the present attitude of the public
and the judiciary on the subject of billboard regulation by govern-
mental agencies regardless of whether or not such regulation is a
proper function of government. We are here interested in what the
public through their law makers ordain shall be done with respect to
this subject and what the courts recognize as valid and constitutional;
and we are not concerned with what political scientists say should be
done.
It is clear at the outset that the power of eminent domain is neither
adequate nor appropriate to deal with the elimination or regulation
of billboards. One sufficient reason is that it would be impracticable
either to measure the damage for the taking or regulating of the prop-
erty rights involved or to provide adequate funds for compensation.
These difficulties, however, do not hamper the use of the police power
for billboard regulation; and, with the exception of laws taxing bill-
boards, all the legislation in this country having for its object the
restriction and regulation or suppression of outdoor advertising is
expressly based upon police power.
The term "police" has never been strictly defined or clearly cir-
cumscribed. Blackstone couples it with economy and defines them
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as "the due regulation and domestic order of the Kingdom, whereby
the individuals of the state, like the members of a well-governed
family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of
propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be decent,
industrious and inoffensive in their respective stations."'
The object of the police power is to bring about "the greatest
good of the greatest number" and its maxim is that "every individual
must submit to such restraints in the exercise of his liberty or of his
rights of property as may be required to remove or reduce the danger
of the abuse of these rights on the part of those who are unskilful,
careless or unscrupulous." 2
From the broad general nature and purpose of this power of gov-
ernment, it will be recognized that it is not a fixed quantity; it is the
expression of current social, economic and political conditions and is
consequently elastic and capable of development to meet changing
conditions.
Blackstone's definition would include the regulation of many mat-
ters which in this country have generally been regarded as outside
of the scope of legislation and governmental control. It would seem
to embrace the regulation of nearly all activities which may injurious-
ly affect the mental, moral, spiritual and physical welfare of the
people. Obviously, at the present stage of our development we are
not prepared to concede that in the exercise of the police power our
governmental agencies can go to such lengths in enacting regulatory
measures. The courts of this country cling tenaciously to our so-called
"constitutional guaranties of liberty".
It is the purpose of this paper (x) to review briefly the recent use of
police power in this country, with particular reference to zoning
ordinances, with a view to considering how much importance courts
14 IBL. COM. *162-175.
2FREuD, POLicE PowER (1904) § 8. Mr. Chief Justice Vickers, writing for the
Supreme Court of Illinois in Haler Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training
School, 249 Ill. 436, 440, 94 N. E. 920, 922 (1911), says: "All uses of property or
courses of conduct which are injurious to the health, comfort, safety and welfare
of society may be prohibited under the sovereign power of the State, even though
the exercise of such power may result in inconvenience or loss to individuals.
In this respect individual rights must be subordinate to the higher rights of the
public. The power.that the State may exercise in this regard is the overruling
law of necessity, and is founded upon the maxim, salus populi est suprema lex.
The existence and exercise of this power are an essential attribute of sovereignty,
and the establishment -of government presupposes that the individual citizen
surrenders all private rights the exercise of which would prove hurtful to the
citizens generally. City of Chicago v. Rogers Park Water Co., 214 111. 212; Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U'. S. 623."
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attribute to esthetic considerations in dealing -with police power
legislation, (2) to examine and analyze the recent court decisions on
legislation and ordinances adopted for the regulation and restriction
of billboards and billboard advertising, and (3) to review-the recent
legislation on the subject of billboard advertising and to consider the
constitutionality of such legislation as an exercise of the police power.
The limitation upon the police power of the states grows out of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution providing that
no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law. This guaranty was not new to our Constitution
but may be noted in the Magna Carta and was originally intended
as a safeguard against the arbitrary use of executive power and not
against legislation. The limitations upon the legislative power
were otherwise provided by express prohibitions against impairing
the obligations of contracts, taking property for public use without
compensation, etc. It is at least doubtful whether the guaranty that
no person should be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law was intended as a curb on the legislative power.
However this may be, it is now uniformly held that the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States applies to the
legislative power of the state governments.
On the broad foundation of the guaranty of private property rights
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, the courts have constructed
the rule that all legislation and municipal ordinances which are adopt-
ed purely for esthetic purposes are invalid. The courts have insisted
that legislative enactments, whether State or local, adopted under
the police power must, in order to be valid, be reasonably calculated
to promote the "safety, health, morals or general welfare of the pub-
lic."
This phrase which appears so frequently in the decisions has of
recent years been expanded to embrace and recognize many laws and
ordinances which a few decades ago would have seemed clearly out-
side of the proper scope of legislative activity. The extent of our
progress along these lines may be visualized if wie can imagine the
astonishment of a citizen of the nineteenth century had he been told
that he could not build on his property within so many feet of the
street line; that he could not conduct a business on his property, or
erect any building over so many feet in height; that he must allow so
much space for courts and area-ways; that he must not permit an un-
reasonable discharge of smoke from his chimneys; that he could be
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put in jail if he carried a bottle of liquor across the street, or carried
on his person a concealed weapon; that his dog must be licensed and
not allowed to roam unmuzzled; and that in numerous other ways
his freedom of action was restricted and limited. He would have
felt that the constitutional guaranties of liberty were a mockery.
And yet all these things have come to pass. In one of these instances
the assistance of a constitutional amendment has been necessary, but
the fact remains that these restrictions on the liberty of the individual
have come to pass just the same.
Municipalities, under authority from the states and with the sanc-
tion of the courts, have gone far in regulating the conduct of in-
dividuals and in restricting the uses to which property may be put.
Thus, regulations have been enacted governing the maintenance of
livery stables,3 public laundries, 4 garages,' the manufacture of bricks,'
dairies,7 the disposition of garbage,8 the height of buildings, 9 stone
crushers, machine shops and carpet beating establishments, 10 the
installation of sinks and water closets in tenement houses," the
slaughter of animals,12 the registration of plumbers,13 hay barns,
wood yards, and laundries, 14 the discharge of smoke, 5 the storing of
oil, 16 change of location of street railroad company tracks, 7 and many
other businesses and activities too numerous to mention. The list
appears to be endless and as time passes the police power expands
with the advance of civilization, equal and responsive to the increas-
ing demands of civic progress.
Perhaps the best example of the modem development of the police
power is to be found in the mass of zoning ordinances which are today
3Reinmanv. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171,35 Sup. Ct. 51I (1915).
'Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 5 Sup. Ct. 730 (1884).
5Matter of McIntosh v. Johnson, 211 N. Y. 265, 105 N. E. 414 (1914).
6Hadacheck v. City of Los Angeles, 239 U. S. 394, 36 Sup. Ct. 143 (1915).
7Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U. S. 361, 24 Sup. Ct. 673 (1903).
sCity of Rochester v. Gutherlett, 211 N. Y. 3o9, 105 N. E. 548 (i9r4).
OWelch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 29 Sup. Ct. 567 (19o8).
1°Matter of Montgomery, 163 Cal. 457, 125 Pac. J070 (1912).
"Tenement House Dept. of N. Y. City v. Moeschen, 179 N. Y. 325, 72 N. E. 231
(I9O4), aff'd, 203 U. S. 583, 27 Sup. Ct. 781 (19o6).
"2Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y. 318 (188o).
1People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden City Prison, 144 N. Y. 529, 39 N. E. 686
(1895).
x4F-c parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220, 118 Pac. 714 (1911).
13City of Rochester v. Macauley Fein Milling Co., 199 N. Y. 207, 92 N. E. 641
(1910).
16Union Oil Co. v. City of Portland, 198 Fed. 441 (D. Ore. 1912); Standard
Oil Co. v. City of Danville, 199 Ill. 50, 64 N. E. 1iO (19o2).
"7People ex rel. City of Olean v. W. N.Y. & Pa. Traction Co., 214 N. Y. 526, 1O8
N. E. 847 (1915).
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commonly in use in progressive communities. Upwards of forty
states have passed laws authorizing zoning ordinances, and although
the struggle to sustain the constitutionality of such ordinances has
met with resistance in some states, it is with less and less frequency
that we find them condemned by the courts as unconstitutional.
That some of our courts have changed their views with respect to
such ordinances during the past twenty years is readily illustrated.
For example, in 1918 the Minnesota courts held that an ordinance
prohibiting an owner from erecting a store building upon land within
a residential district (even where the city had legislative auth6rity
for adopting the ordinance) could not be sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the police power and was an unlawful invasion of the
rights secured to the owner by the constitution. The ordinance
established a residential district and provided that "no person shall
hereafter erect within said district any building except those used
for residence purposes including duplex and double houses, flats,
tenement and apartment houses, and there are hereby prohibited
within said district the erection and maintenance of hotels, stores,
factories, warehouses, dry cleaning plants, public garages or stables
or any industrial establishment or any business whatsoever.' u8
Nine years later the Minnesota Courts held valid and constitu-
tional a zoning ordinance resulting in the exclusion of a four family
flat building from a designated residential district. In sweeping aside
several earlier decisions the court said:
"Zoning statutes are becoming common. The police power, in
its nature indefinable, and quickly responsive, in the interest of
common welfare, to changing conditions, authorizes various re-
frictions upon the use of private property as social and economic
changes come. A restriction, which years ago would have been
intolerable, and would have been thought an unconstitutional
restriction of the owner's use of his property, is accepted now
without a thought that it invades a private right. As social
relations become more complex restrictions on individual rights
become more common. With the crowding of population in the
cities there is an active insistence upon the establishment of
residential districts from which annoying occupations and build-
ings undesirable to the community are excluded.... We hold
that a fair zoning ordinance resulting in the exclusion of a four-
family flat building from a designated residential district is con-
stitutional. This holding is not in harmony with our earlier de-
cisions.'
9
1 State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 158 N. W. 1017 (1916).
1sState ex rd. Beery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 150, 204 N. W. 569, 570
(1925), aff'd, 273 U. S. 671, 47 Sup. Ct. 474 (1927) (Italics are writer's).
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The courts of Illinois in 1913 declared invalid as an excercise of the
police power an ordinance making it unlawful to locate, build or con-
struct any retail store in any block used exclusively for residence pur-
poses without the written consent of a majority of the property own-
ers according to frontage on both sides of the street in the block in
which the building was to be located. In declaring this ordinance
unconstitutional and an improper exercise of the police power, the
court stated that there was nothing inherently dangerous to the
health or safety of the public in conducting a retail store .2
Twelve years later the Illinois Court, naively ignoring its earlier
decision, decided in favor of a zoning ordinance and enjoined a de-
fendant from constructing a building to be used as a grocery store
in a residential district where the operation and maintenance of a
grocery store was prohibited by the zoning ordinance.2'
In the same year the Illinois Court in the case of an owner who de-
sired to erect an apartment house on her property in a residential*
district refused to enjoin the city from enforcing a zoning ordinance
limiting buildings in the residential district to single family dwellings,
churches and temples, schools and colleges, and libraries. .
Zoning ordinances sometimes go so far as to regulate and restrict
the height and bulk of buildings, the size and location of area-ways,
yards, etc. A fair illustration of a modem zoning ordinance is found
in the recent case of Matter of Wulfsohn v. Burden,2' involving a
zoning ordinance of the city of Mount Vernon, which divided the
city into A, B and C residence districts-A and B business districts,
and industrial districts, regulated the height and bulk of buildings,
contained "set-back" restrictions, prescribed the size and extent of
areas, courts, etc. The ordinance was held valid. Another illustra-
tion is found in Lincoln Trust Company v. Williams Building Cor-
poration,'4 where the court sustained a resolution adopted by the
Board of Estimate and Apportionment of the City of New York
pursuant to the so-called Zoning Law25 regulating and limiting and
determining the area of yards, courts and other open spaces and re-
0People ex rel. Friend v. Chicago, 261 IlM. 16, io3 N. E. 6o4 (1913).
2'Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, i49 N. B. 784 (1925).
nDeynzer v. Evanston, 319 Ill. 226, 149 N. E. 790 (1925); See also State v.
New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 44o (1923), criticizing the earlier cases of Blaiser
v. New Orleans, 142 La. 73, 76 So. 244 (i917), and Calvo v. New Orleans, 136 La.
48o, 67 So. 338 (1915).
23241 N. Y. 288, i5o N. E. 120 (1925).
2 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 209 (1920).2 N. Y. Laws igOI, c. 466, asamendedbyN.Y. Laws 1914, c.470, and asfurther
amended by the N. Y. Laws 1916. C. 497.
158 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
stricting the location of trades and industries and the location of
buildings designed for specified uses and establishing the boundaries
of districts for such purposes.
The majority of zoning regulations cannot be said to deprive an
owner of the use of his property. He is permitted to improve it by
the erection of buildings designed for uses which are permitted in the
neighborhood. In the improvement of his property, it is required
that he shall comply with the legislative or municipal idea of what is
necessary for the good of the community.
On the other hand, zoning ordinances which contain setback re-
strictions and establish building lines along private property abutting
on public streets might appear to violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, for they obviously deprive the owner of the use of a portion of
his property. Although there has been some conflict in the decisions
respecting the validity of this feature of such ordinances, the question
has been expressly settled by the United States Supreme Court. Gorieb
v. Fox26 involved an ordinance of Roanoke, Virginia, which, for the
declared purpose of establishing building lines and regulating and
restricting the construction and location of buildings and for other
purposes, divided the city into business and residential districts, and
a further ordinance containing a setback or building line with relation
to the street to which all buildings subsequently eiected were required
to conform. In sustaining these ordinances the Court, by Mr. Jus-
tice Sutherland, after referring to its earlier consideration and dis:
cussion of the question in Euclid v. Ambler Company,27 set at rest all
doubt as to the constitutionality of such an ordinance and stated:
"The remaining contention is that the ordinance, by com-
pelling petitioner to set his building back from the street line of
his lot, deprives him of his property without due process of law.
Upon that question the decisions are divided, as they are in re-
spect of the validity of zoning regulations generally. But, after
full consideration of the conflicting decisions, we recently have
held, Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U. S. 365, that comprehensive
zoning laws and ordinances, prescribing, among other things,
the height of buildings to be erected (Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S.
91) and the extent of the area to be left open for light and air and
in aid of fire protection, etc., are, in their general scope, valid
under the federal Constitution. ' 28
It is becoming more and more apparent from the decisions dealing
with zoning ordinances that a consideration of public esthetics is
2274 U. S. 6o3, 47 Sup. Ct. 675 (1926)-
27272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1926).
28Supra note 26, at 6o8, 47 Sup. Ct. at 677. See also Matter of Wulfsohn v.
Burden, supra note 23.
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regarded as increasingly important in the judicial conception of the
scope of the police power. For example, Mr. Justice Owen, writing
for the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in discussing the validity of a
zoning ordinance, says:
"The benefits to be derived to cities adopting such regulations
may be summarized as follows: They attract a desirable and as-
sure a permanent citizenship; they foster pride in and attachment
to the city; they promote happiness and contentment; they stab-
ilize the use and value of property and promote the peace, tran-
quility, and good order of the city. We do not hesitate to say
that the attainment of these objects affords a legitimate field for
the exercise of the police power. He who owns property in such
a district is not deprived of its use by such regulations. He may
use it for the purposes to which the section in which it is located
is dedicated. That he shall not be permitted to use it to the
desecration of the community constitutes no unreasonable or
permanent hardship and results in no unjust burden.
"It is sometimes said that these regulations rest solely upon
aesthetic considerations. The results which they tend to ac-
complish, as above summarized, are material rather than aesthe-
tic in their nature. It is not necessary for us to consider how far
aesthetic considerations furnish a justification for the exercise of
the police power....
"It seems to us that aesthetic considerations are relative in
their nature. With the passing of time, social standards conform
to new ideals. As a race our sensibilities are becoming more re-
fined and that which formerly did not offend cannot now be en-
dured. That which the common law did not condemn as a nui-
sance is now frequently outlawed as such by the written law.
This is not because the subject outlawed is of a different nature,
but because our sensibilities have become more refined and our
ideals more exacting. Nauseous smells have always come under
the ban of the law, but ugly sights and discordant surroundings
may be just as distressing to keener sensibilities. The rights of
property should not be sacrificed to the pleasure of an ultra-
aesthetic taste. But whether they should be permitted to plague
the average or dominant human sensibilities, well may be pon-
dered." 29
21State v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 158, 196 N. W. 451, 455 (1923). See also the
well considered opinion of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Euclid v. Ambler Co., supra
note 27. See also State v. New Orleans, i54 La. 271, 283, 97 So. 440, 444, 33
A. L. R. 260 (1928), where the court, dealing with zoning ordinances, said:_"If by
the term 'aesthetic considerations' is meant a regard merely for outward ap-
pearances, for good taste in the matter of the beauty of the neighborhood itself,
we do not observe any substantial reason for saying that such a consideration is
not a matter of general welfare.... Why should not the police power avail, as
well to suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by offending the sense of sight,
as to suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by offending the sense of hearing,
or the olfactory nerves? An eyesore in a neighborhood of residences might be as
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And again, in a recent New York case upholding a zoning ordinance
of the City of Mount Vernon which regulated the height of buildings,
the area of yards, courts, etc., and provided for setback restrictions,
the learned Mr. Chief Judge Hiscock, says:
"[The application of the police power has been greatly extend-
ed during a comparatively recent period, and ... while the
fundamental rule must be observed that there is some evil ex-
istent or reasonably to be apprehended which the police power
may be invoked to prevent and that the remedy proposed must
be generally adapted to that purpose, the limit upon conditions
held to come within this rule has been greatly enlarged. The
power is not limited to regulations designed to promote public
health, public morals or public safety or to the suppression of
what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary but extends to so deal-
ing with conditions which exist as to bring out of them the great-
est welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or
general prosperity.""
II
In many states the regulation of billboards and sign advertise-
ments has been left to the municipalities under appropriate delegation
of authority from the state government. Municipalities have no in-
herent power to enact ordinances and by-laws regulating the erection
of signs and billboards; such power must come by a legislative dele-
gation of authority from the State. The power may be by a general
delegation of authority to enact ordinances for police purposes. It may
be conferred by a delegation of authority to pass ordinances for the
good government of the municipality and the preservation of peace
and good order,3 or to-enact ordinances for the prevention and abate-
ment of nuisances.32 Such power also follows by necessary implication
from a delegation of authority to license and regulate bill posters and
bill distributors and sign advertising. It is also generally considered
much a public nuisance, and as ruinous to property values in the neighborhood
generally, as a disagreeable noise, or odor, or a menace to safety or health. The
difference is not in principle, but only in degree. In fact, we believe that the bill-
-board case, Cusack v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 526, 37 Sup. Ct. 19o, 61 L. Ed. 472,
L. R. A. x918 A, 136, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 594, or St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v.
St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269, 39 Sup. Ct. 274, 63 L. Ed. 599, or the skyline case,
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 29 Sup. Ct. 567, 53 L. Ed. 923, or the case of
Hubbard v. Taunton, 14 ° Mass. 467, 5 N. E. 157, might have rested as logically
upon the so-called aesthetic considerations as upon the supposed other consider-
ations of general welfare."
2
°Matter of Wulfsohn v. Burden, supra note 23, at 298, 15o N. E. at 122.
3
'Gunning System v. Buffalo, 75 App. Div. 31, 77 N. Y. Supp. 987 (4th Dept.
1902).
nChicago v. Gunning System, 214 Ill. 628, 73 N. E. 1O35 (I9O5).
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to be included in the general welfare clause, where the charter has
one.
Municipal ordinances adopted under the police power must be
reasonable, and it is within the jurisdiction of the courts to pronounce
upon their reasonableness.-
In ruling upon the constitutionality of municipal ordinances
regulating signs and billboards, the test generally applied by the
courts has been whether or not the ordinance could be said to be rea-
sonably adapted to preserve and protect the health, morals, safety
and general welfare of the people. Thus the United States Supreme
Court in sustaining as constitutional an ordinance of the City of
Chicago regulating signs and billboards, held it to be important and
material that the evidence introduced upon the trial showed, and the
Supreme Court of Illinois found, that
"... fires had been started in the accumulation of combustible
material which gathered about such billboards; that offensive
and unsanitary accumulations are habitually found about them,
and that they afford a convenient concealment and shield for im-
moral practices, and for loiterers and criminals."3 4
The court also noted evidence offered on the trial and which the
Supreme Court of Illinois held had been erroneously excluded by the
trial court tending to show that
".... residence sections of the city did not have as full police
and fire protection as other sections have, and that the streets
of such sections are more frequented by unprotected women and
children than, and are not so well lighted as, other sections of the
city are, and that most of the crimes against women and children
are offenses against their persons."3a
The court concluded that there was sufficient testimony to show
convincingly the propriety of putting billboards as distinguished
from buildings and fences in a class by themselves and to justify the
UYick Wo v. Hopkins, Ix8 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1o64 (I885).
3
'Cusack Company v. City of Chicago, 242 U. S. 526, 529, 37 Sup. Ct. i9o, 19I
(1916). The ordinance under consideration in this case read as follows: "It
shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to erect or construct any
billboard or signboard in any block on any public street in which one-half of the
buildings on both sides of the street are used exclusively for residence purposes
without first obtaining the consent in writing of the owners or duly authorized
agents of said owners owning a majority of the frontage of the property on both
sides of the street in the block in which such billboard or signboard is to be erected,
constructed or located. Such written consents shall be filed with the Com-
missioner of Buildings before a permit shall be issued for the erection, construction
or location of such billboards or signboards."
34alWi.
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prohibition against their erection in residence districts of a city in
the interest of the safety, morals, health and decency of the com-
munity.
Approaching the problem from the same viewpoint, the New York
Court of Appeals condemned as unconstitutional an ordinance of the
city of New York containing an absolute prohibition against the
erection of "sky signs" unless they comlilied with the detailed re-
quirements of the code. The court pointed out that the absolute
prohibition in this case was confined wholly to "sky signs", as they
were defined in the ordinance, and that it Was not the structure but
the wording, announcement, direction or advertisement which was
prohibited; that such wording, announcement, direction or advertise-
ment, has no relation to the safety of the structure itself; that the
ordinance was not directed solely against indecent or immoral
advertisements but against all advertisements; and that it conse-
quently appeared that the ordinance in question was not enacted in
the interest of the public health, morals or safety, or to 'conserve
public peace, order and general welfare.3
Where, however, it has appeared that the ordinance was reasonably
adapted for the protection and promotion of the safety, health and
general welfare of the people, the New .Vork courts have ndt hes-
itated to sustain it. Thus an ordinance of the City of Rochester was
upheld which forbade the erection within the city limits of billboards
more tharr six feet in height without the consent of the common
council. The court stated that the purpose of the ordinance was to
obviate a real danger to the public since billboard structtqres un-
limited as to height and dimensions
"might readily become a constant and continuing danger to
the lives and persons of those who should pass along the street in
proximity to them." 6
35People ex rel. M. Wineburgh Adv. Co. v. Murphy, 195 N. Y. 126, 88 N. E. 17
(I9O9). But see People ex rel. Publicity Leasing Co. v. Ludwig, 218 N. Y. 540,
i 13N. E. 532 (i956) where the New York court sustained an ordinance regulating
the structure of sky signs.
"
6City of Rochester v. West, 164 N. Y. 510, 514, 58 N. E. 673, 674 (1900). See
also People ex rel. Van Beuren and New York Bill Posting Co. v. Miller, 161
App. Div. 138, 146 N. Y. Supp. 403 (Ist Dept. 1914). The Missouri courts have
formulated three propositions governing the power of municipalities to regulate
billboards. "First, that municipal corporations, even under their general police
powers may, by ordinance, exercise reasonable control over the construction and
maintenance of billboards, house signs and sky signs. Second, that said power to
regulate said matters begins where the public safety, health, morals and good
government demand such regulation, and ends where those public interests will
not be beneficially served thereby. And third, that the mere unsightliness of bill-
-/
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The Circuit Court for the Southern District of California sustained
an ordinance of the city of Los Angeles making it unlawful to "erect,
build, construct, or maintain in the city of Los Angeles any fence,
building or other structure of or to a greater height than six feet from
the surface of a sidewalk, street br the ground where the same is
erected, built, constructed or maintained for the purpose of contain-
ing thereon any sign or a dvertisement for advertising purposes or
posting thereon or affixing or attaching thereto or thereon any bills
or signs, placards, cards, posters or other advertising matter for ad-
vertising purposes."37 In sustaining the ordinance, Judge Ross wrote
as follows:
"It is a matter of common knowledge, and therefore within
the fotice of the court (Brown v. Spilman, 155 U. S. 665, 15 Sup.
Ct. 245, 39 L. Ed. 304), that these are usually, if not invariably,
cheap and flimsy affairs, constructed of wood, and erected on va-
cant lots of land along or near to the streets, in order to catch the
eye of the passers-by. Such structures, if of sufficient height,
may be very readily blown over by wind, or shaken down by an
earthquake, and in such event (depending upon their height and
proximity to the public thoroughfare) may very easily cause in-
jury to persons standing or passing thereon. Moreover, the
views in and about a city, if beautiful and unobstructed, con-
stitute one of its chief attractions, and in that way add to the
comfort and well-being of its people. Billboards for advertising
purposes, erected to any great height, would undoubtedly be
subject to all of these, as well as other, objections, and such
structures are, therefore, plainly within the regulating power of
the governing body of the city."31a
An ordinance of the city of St. Louis which went much farther
than either the Rochester or Los Angeles ordinances just referred to,
came before the Supreme Court of the United States in St. Louis
Poster Advertising Company v. St. Louis.38 This ordinance allowed
no billboard of 25 feet square or more to be put up without a permit
and none to extend more than 14 feet above the ground; required an
open space of 4 feet between the lower edge and the ground and for-
bade an approach nearer than 6 feet to any building or to the side of
any lot or nearer than 2 feet to any other billboard or I5 feet to the
street; required conformity to the building line; limited billboards in
boards and of similar structures as well as their failure to conform to esthetics, is
no valid reason for their total or partial suppression." Kansas City Gunning
Adv. Co. v. Kansas City, 240 Mo. 659, 144 S. W. O99 (1912); St. Louis Gunning
Adv. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929 (I91I).
37In re Wilshire, i03 Fed. 620 (C. C. S. D. Cal. I9oo).
37fljW. at 623, 39 Sup. Ct. 274.
3249 U. S. 269, 39 Sup. Ct. 274 (1918).
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area to 500 square feet; and exacted a permit fee of $x.oo for every
five lineal feet. The ordinance was sustained as a valid exercise of
the police power. It was urged in the Supreme Court that the several
restrictions were unreasonable and unconstitutional limitations on
the liberty of the individual and on rights of property in land. Re-
plying to this argument Mr. Justice Holmes writing for the court said:
"But the argument comes too late. This court has recognized
the correctness of the decision in St. Louis Gunning Advertising
Company v. St. Louis, 235 Missouri, 99, followed -in this case,
that billboards properly may be put in a class by themselves
and prohibited in residence districts of a city 'in the interest
of the safety, morality, health and decency of the community.'
Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 526, 529, 530. It is true that
according to the bill the plaintiff has done away with dangers
from fire and wind, but apart from the question whether those
dangers do not remain sufficient to justify the general rule, they
are or may be the least of the objections adverted to in the
cases. 235 Missouri, 99. Kansas City Gunning Advertising Co.
v. Kansas City, 240 Missouri, 659, 671. Possibly one or two de-
tails, especially the requirement of conformity to the building
line, have aesthetic considerations in view more obviously than
anything else. But as the main burdens imposed stand on other
ground, we should not be prepared to deny the validity of rel-
atively trifling requirements that did not look solely to the satis-
faction of rudimentary wants that alone we generally recognize
as necessary. Hubbard v. Taunton, 140 Massachusetts 467,
4 68."38a
Instances might be multiplied of ordinances regulating billboards
which have been before the courts for consideration,39 but they would
all tend to show that the courts have uniformly held ordinances valid
which have been shown to be reasonably designed to promote and
protect the safety, health, morals or general welfare of the public.
The courts have never defined the phrase "general welfare." It is
conceivable that as time passes, if the general public develops a
UsaIbid 274, 39 Sup. Ct. at 275.
39See inter alia Whitmier & Filbrick Co. v. Buffalo, 118 Fed. 773 (C. C. W. D.
N. Y. 1902); Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, IoO Pac. 867 (I9O9); Bill
Posting Sign Co. v. Atlantic City, 71 N. J. L. 72, 58 Atl. 342 (19o4); State v.
Whitlock, 149 N. C. 542, 63 S. E. 123 (19o8) ; Gibbons v. Missouri, K. & T. R. R.,
285 Pac. lO4O (Okla. 1930); Bryan v. Chester, 212 Pa. 259, 6I Atl. 894 (1905).
Ordinances prohibiting the placing of any advertising device upon any fence or
other structure in, about, or upon any vacant land fronting upon public parks
have been declared invalid as an unreasonable restriction upon the use of prop-
erty. Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, supra note 2;
Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N. E. 6or (19o5);
People v. Green, 85 App. Div. 4o0, 83 N. Y. Supp. 46o (ist Dept. I9o3). *
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higher sense of esthetics, the phrase "general welfare" may be given
a sufficiently broad meaning to permit the courts to uphold as a valid
exercise of the police power an ordinance prompted solely by esthetic
considerations.
That the courts are alive to the possibility of future governmental
regulation of unsightly advertisements as such and are pointing the
way for a valid and constitutional broadening of the police power
may reasonably be inferred from the trend of court decisions and
opinions. For example, in Cochran v. Preston the court admitted
that by the weight of authority regulations designed only to enforce
upon the people the legislative conceptions af artistic beauty and
symmetry will not be sustained however much such regulations may
be needed for the artistic education of the people, but the court added:
"Such is undoubtedly the weight of authority, though it may
be that in the development of a higher civilization, the culture
and refinement of the people has reached the point where the
educational value of the Fine Arts, as expressed and embodied
in architectural symmetry and harmony, is so well recognized as
to give sanction, under some circumstances, to the exercise of
this power even for such purposes. 4"
In the same connection, the forward-looking opinion of Mr. Justice
Angell in the recent case of People v. Sterling4 may profitably be
given attention. The case involved an alleged violation of Section
61-a of the Conservation Law of New York which read as follows:
"Use of signs and billboards restricted. In order to conserve
the natural beauty of the Adirondack park by preserving and
regulating it for public uses for the resort of the public for recrea-
tion, pleasure, air, light and enjoyment by keeping it open,
clean and in good oider for the welfare of society, and to abate
the public nuisance which has arisen through the unrestricted
use of signs and billboards therein, no person shall erect or main-
tain within the boundaries thereof any advertising sign or bill-
board, except under written permit from the commission. The
provisions of this section shall not apply to signs erected or main-
tained upon property in connection with a business conducted
thereon, or within the limits of an incorporated village."
The complaint alleged that the defendant had been maintaining
within the boundaries of the Adirondack Park eleven billboards
varying in size from 6 x 12 to 12 x 24 feet. The signs were erected on
private property in sight of and close to the State highways running
through the park between Lake Placid and Saranac Lake.
401o8 Md. 220, 70 AtI. 113 (1908).
40a2id. 229, 70 AtI. at 114.
41128 Misc. 65o, 220 N. Y. Supp. 315 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
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The defendant made a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action on the theory that Section 61-a of the Con-
servation Law was unconstitutional. In denying the motion the
court pointed out that the statute states two purposes- (i) "to con-
serve the natural beauty of the Adirondack Park" and (2) "to abate
the public nuisance which has arisen through the unrestricted use of
signs"; that the declaration in the statute that an act is a public
nuisance will not take the place of proof and the complainant is en-
titled to his day for offering proof; and that the constitutionality of
the statute could not therefore be determined on a motion.
Having reached this conclugion, the court by way of dicta says:
"If the statute here in question had been worded with more
care the first part of it would not have to stand or fall as voicing
solely an esthetic object. That it is so infelicitously w6rded in
this respect is unfortunate. If, for instance, it had been made
to read, 'In order to conserve the natural beauty of the Adiron-
dack Park, and to preserve and regulate it for public uses. . . and
enjoyment, and to keep it open .. .and to abate the public nui-
sance which had arisen,' etc., a different situation would be pre-
sented. We have reached a point in the development of the
police power where an esthetic purpose needs but little assistance
from a practical one in order to withstand an attack on consti-
tutional grounds...."
"Perhaps a statute which, in addition to conserving the natural
beauty of the Adirondack Park, also declared its object to be to
preserve and regulate it for public uses and enjoyment, and to
keep it open, clean and in good order for the welfare of society
(which includes the public health), might have just the additional
elements of strength necessary to enable it to stand. There
surely should be some way to curb the modem billboard nuisance,
aside from the efforts of public-spirited women. It would seem
to be fairly certain that, when the State highways through the
privately owned lands in the Adirondack Park become solidly
lined with billboards, hot dog stands, and stations furnished in
connection with gasoline selling agencies conspicuously labeled
'For men' and 'For women,' the State will have some right to
intervene in behalf of a long-suffering public. If it will have the
right then, it should have it before the line becomes absolutely
solid. And perhaps it should have it at the point where we are
now. The People have a vast investment in the Adirondack
Park. The police power should be-sufficient to enable them to
enjoy it to the utmost."42
Another recent New York case throws considerable light on the
present and probable future trend of judicial opinion regarding
governmental regulation of billboard advertising as such. People v.
4'2 bid. 655, 220 N. Y. Supp. at 318.
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WolJf" involved an ordinance of the small and exclusive residential
Village of Kings Point on Long Island reading as follows:
"Section i. It shall be unlawful for any person to post, erect or
maintain any advertisement in the form of a bill or sign or other
device or display within the Village of Kings Point or for any
owner of property within the Village of Kings Point to permit
the posting, erection or maintenance on his property of any adver-
tisement in such form; except that signs solely advertising real
property to be for sale or for rent may be placed on the real
property so advertised, not nearer than twenty-five feet to a
public street or highway or, in the case of developed property,
not nearer to such street or highway than the building line there-
of, provided that no such sign shall be so placed as to obstruct
the clear view of the highway from any direction, and further
provided that no such sign shall be of greater dimensions than
four feet by four feet.
"Section 2. Any person violating the provisions of this
Ordinance, or any part thereof, shall be liable for and forfeit and
pay a penalty not exceeding Fifty dollars for each offence.
"Any violation of this ordinance, or any part thereof, shall
constitute disroderly conduct, and the person violating the same
shall be and is hereby declared a disorderly person."
The defendants, Wolf and Jennings, being employer and employee
respectively, erected in violation of this ordinance a billboard nine
feet high by twelve feet wide, advertising land for sale. The sole
violation arose by reason of the size of the billboard. They were
convicted by a Police Justice of the Village of Kings Point and upon
appeal to the County Court of Nassau County, the conviction was
reversed on the ground that the ordinance was invalid and an im-
proper exercise of the police power. The opinion of the County Judge
stated that the ordinance was based solely upon esthetic consider-
ations; that to be valid, it was essential that the ordinance be designed
in the interests of public health, public safety, public morals or the
general welfare; and that as none of these purposes was within the
purview of the ordinance, the same was illegal and void.
The People appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, and that court, holding the ordinance to be a valid exercise of
the police power, reversed the County Court and affirmed the judg-
ment of conviction of the Police Court." The Appellate Division,
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Kapper, after reviewing the cases deal-
ing with the exercise of the police power in modem times and remark-
ing on the expanding scope of this governmental power, stated that
in its opinion the ordinance bore a substantial relation to public
'I27 Misc. 382, 216 N. Y. Supp. 741 (Co. Ct. 1926).
4422o App. Div. 71 , 220r N. Y. Supp. 656 (2d Dept. 1927).
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health, safety, morals'and general welfare in that the evidence showed
that the land behind billboards was a depository for trash, litter, and
debris of every character and description, that leaves and other in-
flamable material would accumulate about them and be a possible
source of fire and a menace to health, etc. The opinion continues:
"Even without such evidence, must we close our eyes to the
obvious? If the respondents are correct in the position which
they take, then this village is powerless to either regulate or
prohibit billboards. The result of that is, of course, no ordinance,
no restriction whatever. What does such a situation come to?
Signs of inordinate height may be erected from the ground up
and on the street line and for an indefinite linear space. Must
the municipality appoint supervisors to inspect the safety of
such structures and thus tax residents in no manner benefited
so that an owner of property may lease the land to sign or bill-
board advertisers? Are the nuisances which are created be-
hind such billboards to go on, increase and become permanent to
the menace of the health of the community, as well as its morals?
These things are universally known and should be accepted in
law as facts. If these views are correct, then how can it be said
that this ordinance does not aim at subserving or have 'substan-
tial relation to the public health, safety, morals or to the general
welfare'."a
An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals,45 which was dis-
missed on the ground that, under the rules of practice, in New York,
the Appellate Division had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal before
that court; that since no appeal lay to that tribunal from the County
Court, the judgment of the Appellate Division was void; the case was
improperly before the Court of Appeals, and the judgment of reversal
of the County Court was undisturbed.
Although this technical ruling of the Court of Appeals negatives
the effect of the Appellate Division's decision in this case, neverthe-
less, the opinion of the Appellate Division is illuminating as indicative
of the liberal tendencies of the courts on this subject.
Ill
Billboard legislation in this country has for the most part been
enacted only during the past decade, but the popular demand for
such legislation has been so great that in this short period of time
statutes dealing with the subject have been adopted in thirty-three
states. The legislation is regulatory in its character and may for
convenience be divided into several groups.
4Thid. 77, 220 N. Y. Supp. at 661.
45247 N. Y. 189, i59.N. E. 906 (1928).
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i. California has forbidden the placing or displaying of any ad-
vertisement on public property without consent, and has declared
that anyone violating this statute is guilty of a misdemeanor.46 Sim-
ilar legislation has been adopted in Colorado,4 7 Connecticut,4 8 Ii-
nois,49 Iowa,"0 Louisiana," Maine,", Maryland," Michigan," Min-
nesota,"s New Jersey, 6 North Carolina, 57 North Dakota,5 8 Pennsyl-
vania, 9 and Utah."
2. A statute of North Carolina provides that anyone placing ad-
vertising matter on private property without first obtaining the
written consent of the owner is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject
to fine or imprisonment." Legislation of a similar nature has been
adopted in California,62 Colorado," Connecticut," Illinois,O Indiana6 ,
Louisiana, 6 7 Maryland, "I New Jersey,69 New York,70 Pennsylvania,7'
Rhode Island, 71 and Utah.73
3. New York permits anyone to remove advertising matter from
along public highways which has been placed there without per-
4 CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1923), Act 89; ibid. Act 3267, § 6; CAL. PEN. CODE
(Deering, 1923) §§ 602 ef seg.
47 COLO. CoMe. LAWS (1921) § 7017.
4 CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1921) c. 79.
49ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1924) c. 38, §453 (9).
501OWA CODE (1924) §§ 4846-7.
RLA. REv. STAT. ANN. (Marr, 1926) 381.
52Me. Laws 1925, C. I88.
"MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 39A, § 24.
"Mich. Laws 1925, no. io8, § S.
1MiNN. STAT. (Mason, 1923) § 261S (3).
ON. J. CoMP. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1925) 21.
57N. C. Laws 1924 (extra sess.) c. 1O9.
18N. D. CoMp. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1925) § 2037b.
5118 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) § 3082; Pa. Laws 1925 no. 388.
I°Utah Laws 1923, C. 27.
61N. C. Laws 1924 (extra sess.) c. lO9.
61CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1923) Act 89; CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1923)
§§ 602, et seq.
6'COLO. CoMe. LAWS (1921) § 7017.
"CONN. GEN. STAT. (1921) C. 79.
"ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahil, 1924) C. 38, § 453 (9).
66IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 2504.
67LA. REv. STAT. ANN. (Marr, 1926) 382.
18MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 39A, § 24.
69N. 3. CoMP. STAT. (Cure. Supp. 1925) 21.
70N. Y. CONS. LAWS, C. 40 (PENAL LAW) §§ 121, 1423 (1).
,18 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) § 3082.
72R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 6098.
nUtah Laws 1923, C. 27.
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mission from the proper governmental authority.7 4 New Jersey7 1
and Rhode Island 7 have adopted similar legislation.
4. In New Jersey, by statute, a presumption is raised that the
person whose goods are advertised authorized the unlawful placing
of the advertisement." Similar provisions appear in the New York78
and Colorado 7 laws.
5. Vermont exacts a license fee from anyone engaging in the busi-
ness of outdoor advertising within the state.80 Statutes requiring
licenses for anyone engaging in the business of outdoor advertising,
or taxing billboards, have also been adopted in Connecticut,8' Flor-
ida,8 Michigan,81 Mississippi," New Jersey,"' and Vermont.8"
6. A statute has been adopted in Colorado prohibiting the erection
of billboards along any highway outside city limits within 300 feet
of intersecting corners or sharp curves if such structure would inter-
fere with the view of an approaching vehicle.87 Legislation of a
similar nature has been enacted in Iowa,8 8 Kansas,89 Maine,9" Mich-
igan,"' Nebraska, 92 North Dakota,93 South Dakota, 4 Vermont,9"
Washington,98 and Wisconsin. 97
7. Arkansas has enacted legislation which prohibits the erection
of any billboard within ioo yards of a state highway calculated to
make travelers leave such highway and travel any public road to
any town, etc., in the state unless the person erecting such billboard
74N. Y. CONS. LAWS, c. 40 (PENAL LAW) §§ 121, 1423 (11).
76N. J. Comr. STAT. (CuM. Supp. 1925) 21.
76R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 6o98.
77N. J. CoMP. STAT. (CUM. Supp. 1925) 21.
78N. Y. CONS. LAWS, c. 40 (PENAL LAW) §§ 121, 1423 (II).
79CoLo. COmP. LAWS (1921) § 7017.
8OVt. Laws 1925, no. 32.
81CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) §§ 3024, e Seg.
82FLA. GEN. LAWS (Skillman, 1927) § 1071.
8Mich. Laws 1925, nO. 325.
8IMiss. Laws 1924, c. 117, § 3 (amending Code, § 3779).
8N. J. ComP. STAT. (1910) pp. 656, 659.
86t. Laws 1925, nO. 32.
87CoLo. CoMP. LAWS (1923) c. 128.
88IOWA CODE (1924) §§ 4844-5.
819KAN. REV. STATS. ANN. (1923) c. 19, § 2612.
"
0Me. Laws 1925, C. Y88.
91Mich. Laws 1925, nO. IO8, § 6.
9Neb. Laws 1923, C. 159.
93N. D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1925) § 2037b.
1S. D. Laws 1925, c. 186.
9Vt. Laws 1925, no. 32.
96Wash. Laws 1923, c. 129 (Code Supp. §§ io5io-3, et seg.).
97WIS. STAT. (1927) 343,482.
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shall first obtain permission of the State Highway Commission. The
statute further prohibits the erection of billboards giving false in-
formation as to highways, provides that a violator shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and fined, and further provides for the removal of any
sign boards then in existence giving such misleading information. 8
8. Connecticut prohibits any sign within 300 feet of any state
highway having the word "Danger" thereon or any other word used
to give warning to traffic except under authorization from the High-
way Commissioner. Signs erected by municipalities are excepted
from this prohibition provided that none of such signs shall contain
advertising matter. The Highway Commissioner is given authority
to remove any signs in violation of this statute and a fine is provided
for violation.99
There is also a statute in Connecticut prohibiting the dropping of
handbills from airplanes except over a place established for that pur-
pose.100
Although the foregoing will give some idea of the legislation which
has been generally adopted throughout the country, it is, perhaps,
of interest to summarize some of the more comprehensive statutes
in a few states.
In 1925 Vermont enacted legislation which prohibits the display
of advertising matter over six feet square except in proximity to the
place of manufacture of the goods advertised unless the person or
corporation displaying such advertising matter shall first obtain a
license to do so and pay the license fee required by the statute. Bill-
boards are required to meet with the approval of the Secretary of
State with the exception of advertisements erected by towns and
highway signs placed at points of danger. Billboards may not be
erected within 50 feet of public parks except on buildings where the
goods advertised are manufactured. A non-resident desiring to erect
advertising displays in the state is required to give a bond. The
Secretary of State may require the removal of any billboard or ad-
vertising matter if in his opinion the vision along the highway is ob-
structed, and if the owner fails to remove the billboard it may be
removed by order of the Secretary of State and the cost of removal
charged to the owner. All signs in violation of the Act are to be
removed by the State Highway Department and penalties are pro-
vided for violation of the statute.10'
98Ark. Laws 1925, no. 135.
O'Conn. Laws 1925, C. 103.
1 0CONN. GEN. STAT. (1925) C. 249, § i.
101W. Laws 1925. no. 32.
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In Nevada, by statute, it is unlawful for anyone to place adver-
tising matter on any improved state highway, or within 20 feet of the
main traveled way of unimproved highways, or on property of another
in view of such highway without the owner's written consent. Signs
within the limits of an incorporated town are excepted as are also
notices required by law. It is unlawful outside of the limits of a town
to put any billboard on public property, or on leased land if the manu-
facture of the goods advertised is not done on such land, and unless
a permit is first obtained. Fees are provided for such permits, and
a limited exception is made for billboards already erected at the time
the statute was passed. No permit may be granted where the bill-
board would measurably destroy the natural beauty of the scenery or ob-
struct the view. Any sign which is a hazard to traffic may be removed.
Violations are declared to be a public nuisance and the violator
guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to fine or imprisonment.'0'
The Penal Law of New York provides that any person who places
advertising matter on property without the owner's consent is
punishable by imprisonment or fine.'0' It further provides that any
person placing advertising matter on public property without per-
mission is liable to imprisonment or fine and that unlawful adver-
tising matter along public highways may be removed by anyone.1'°
No person may erect a billboard in the Adirondack State Park except
under authority of the Park Commission, but this prohibition does
not apply to signs on premises on which the business advertised is
conducted or in the limits of an incorporated village. 05
- Massachusetts, seeking to avoid the delay incident to the natural
evolution of the law through the courts, adopted in 1918 an amend-
ment to its Constitution by the insertion of a new article reading as
follows:
"Article L: Advertising on public ways in public places and
on private property within public view may be regulated and
restricted by law."
In 1921 a statute was enacted providing for the regulation of
billboards on public highways, requiring licenses, and giving to
the State Department of Public Works jurisdiction over advertising
signs on public ways "or on private property within public view of
any highway, public park or reservation". 06 In 1924 the Division of
1mNev. Laws 1925, C. 90.
'0N. Y. CONS. LAWS, C. 40 (PENAL LAW) § 121.
io4,fl. § 1423 (II).
'0N. Y. Laws 1924, c. 531.
101MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 93, as amended by Mass. Acts 1924, c. 329, c.
334, C. 490.
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Highways of the Department of Public Works adopted rules and
regulations for the control and restriction of billboards, signs and
other advertising devices. These regulations were put into effect on
January 24, 1924. They require that permits be obtained for adver-
tising signs, that no permit shall be granted for a sign within 300 feet
of any public park or reservation if visible from any part of the same,
that no outdoor advertising shall be painted or affixed upon any fence
or pole within 5o feet of any public way or upon any rock or tree nor
directly upon any wall, and that no permit will be granted to place
signs near certain public ways where in the opinion of the Division of
Highways, having regard to the usual scenic beauty of the territory,
signs would be particularly harmful to the public welfare.
An attack was immediately launched against this legislation and
the Department's regulations by the billboard interests. The matter
is now pending in three separate cases before the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts. Evidence has been taken by a Master but
no decision has at this writing been rendered.
The New Jersey law regulating billboards and enacted in the t9o
session of the New Jersey Legislature is perhaps one of the most com-
plete acts on this subject.107 It provides that no person, firm or cor-
poration shall engage in the business of outdoor advertising for profit
without a license from the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and pay-
ment of the sum of $ioo as a fee. Such license is to remain in force
for a year and may be renewed annually upon the same terms. The
applications for licenses are to be on forms furnished by the Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles and such information must be given as is
required in the application. In addition, a permit must be obtained
for the erection and use of each billboard or other structure for adver-
tising purposes. No person, firm or corporation not engaged in the
business of outdoor advertising for profit may erect or maintain any
billboard or other structure for advertising except on the premises
where the business advertised is carried on without a permit from
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. A tax of three cents per square
foot is levied on each billboard or structure used and it is required
that every person desiring to erect or maintain such billboard shall
file detailed specifications with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
as to each billboard to be used. The name and address of the
person owning such billboard must be inscribed thereon. No
permit is required for billboards on real estate exclusively for the
purpose of advertising the same for sale or to let, or to erect or
maintain a billboard on the premises where the business advertised
107N. J. Laws 1930, c. 41.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
is carried on. Non-residents of the state desiring to maintain
billboards in the state are required to file with the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles a bond of $1,ooo. No billboard or other structure
for advertising purposes may be erected or maintained within a dis-
tance of 500 feet of an intersection of a highway with another high-
way, railroad, or street railway at a point where it would interfere
with a view of a train, street car or other vehicle on the intersecting
highway or railroad or street railway, and no billboard may be erected
on any public property without the written consent of the Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles. No permit may be issued for any billboard
"which in the judgment of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is or
would be injurious to property in the vicinity thereof or injuriously
affect any public interest." An exception is contained in the Act for
contracts made prior to January i, 1930, for the construction or use
of billboards until the term of such contract shall have expired. Vio-'
lations of the Act are punishable by a fine of $xoo and it is provided
that every day that such violation continues is to be treated a as.
separate violation of the Act.
But little doubt can be expressed as to the validity of most of this
legislation. The reasonable taxation of billboards and the require-
ments for license fees are clearly within the powers of the states.
The prohibition against the erection of billboard structures near
intersecting highways or railroad crossings seems justified and re-
quired for the protection of the traveling public. The right of the
State to make it a misdemeanor for anyone to erect a billboard on
public property without consent will not be seriously questioned.
The statutes which declare it to be a misdemeanor for anyone to
erect a billboard or place an advertisement on private property with-
out the consent of the owner may likewise be expected to withstand
attack.
The statutes which are likely to receive the most attention from
the billboard interests are those like the Nevada statute which pro-
hibit billboards that "destroy the natural beauty of the scenery".
Such a provision is clearly prompted solely by esthetic consideration.
It may be stated to be in furtherance of the health, safety, morals
and general welfare of the people, but in dealing with it, the courts
will be compelled to answer the question whether or not the police
power may legally be extended to justify such regulation resting
solely on considerations of esthetics or artistic beauty or the pre-
servation of the country-side free from defacement by unsightly
advertisements.
England has dealt with the billboard problem in the Advertise-
ments Regulation Acts of 1907 and 1925 which, read together,
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authorize the prescribed local authorities to make by-laws for regulat-
ing, restricting or preventing within their district the exhibition of
advertisements in such places and in such manner or by such means
as to affect injuriously: (a) the amenities of a public park or pleasure
promenade; or (b) the natural beauties of a landscape; or (c) the
view of rural scenery from a highway or railroad or from any public
place or water; or (d) the amenities of any village within the district
of a rural district council (in Scotland, within the district of a county
exclusive of any burgh situated therein); or (e) any amenities of any
historic building or monument or of any places frequented by the
public solely or generally on account of its beauty or historic interest.
It is required by these acts that the by-laws be confirmed by the
Home Secretary and in Scotland by the Secretary for Scotland. Ex-
emptions are included in the acts for advertisements existing at the
time the by-laws are made which are exempt for a period of five years,
and further, for advertisements upon land relating solely to any trade
or business carried on there. By-laws adopted under the authority
of the Advertisements Regulation Acts and confirmed by the Home
Secretary, have been upheld by the English Courts. 0 7a
Legislation for the control and restriction of billboard advertising
has also been adopted in Bermuda, °lb Newfoundland,'0 8 Ontario, 109
New Zealand,1 9a New South Wales,109b Hongkong,"0 Palestine,"'
Queensland,1 2 South Australia,"' Victoria,"4 and Western Australia."'
107aUnited Bill Posting Co. v. Somerset County Council, 95 L. J. K. B. 899
(1926).
1olbAdvertisements Regulation Act of March 14, 1911. I Bermuda Laws (1923)
460.
10 8NEWFOUNDLAND CONS. STAT. (1916) c. 55.
10nt. Stat. 1915, c. 17, § 37, P. 52; Ont. Stat. 1926, c. I5, § 77, P. 203; Ont.
Stat. 1927, c. 22, § 15; ONT. REV. STAT. (1927) c. 54, § 78.
logaNew Zealand Stat. 19o3, No. 54, 3 EDW. VII, 240; amended New Zealand
Stat. 19o6, No. 46, 6 EDW. VII, 128.
109bLocal Government Act, 19o6, No. 56, § 115, 7 New So. Wales Stat. 1907, 759.
These provisions were later amended, to conform to the language of the English
Advertisements Regulation Act of 1907. Local Government Act, 19o8, No. 28,
§ i9, 8 New So. Wales Stat. 1912, 129; id. 1919 no. 41, §§ 249j, 510, 15 New So.
Wales Stat. 1920, 325, 429. By-laws made under these acts have been upheld
against the claim that they were unreasonable and ultra vires. Er parte Hagon,
8 N. S. W. St. R. 58 (19O8); Bennett v. Daniels, 12 N. S. W. St. R. 134 (1912).
n
1 0Advertisements Regulation Ordinance, May 17, 1912, 4 Ordinances of Hong-
kong (1924) 2196; 2 Laws of Hongkong (1913) 2251.
"Ir Legislation of Palestine 1918-1925 (1926) 6o.
112Local Authorities Act, 2 EDW. VII, No. 19, 4th sched. § 55 (1902); 2 Queens-
land Stat. 1911, 2018.
113So. Australia Acts 1916, no. 1238. n1 4Vict. Stat. 1914, no. 2557.
11 W. Australia Acts 19o6, no. 32, § 179 (19), 6 EDW. VII, 55. A drastic by-law
under this act has been upheld. Lean v. Barrett, 19 W. A. L. R. 86. (1917).
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As bearing upon the possible attitude of the courts in this country
toward modem billboard legislation, the recent case of General Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis,' decided by the Indiana Su-
preme Court is of some significance. This case dealt with an ordi-
nance adopted July 8, 1922, by the Board of Park Commissioners of
Indianapolis, prohibiting the location or maintenance of any billboard
or advertising device or structure, or the leasing of any premises for
the purpose, within 500 feet of any park, parkway or boulevard, and
directing that all such existing structures within the city be removed.
The court upheld the ordinance as a proper exercise of police power but
stated that it was not enforceable against billboards lawfully existing
at the time the ordinance was adopted unless compensation were
provided for the owners of such billboards. In the course of its
opinion the court referred to certain earlier decisions in Colorado,
Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina and Ohio, in some of which the courts declared un-
constitutional prohibitions against the erection of billboards within
given distances of parks and boulevards, and the Indiana court in-
dicated its opinion that if the same cases were presented today the
decisions would be in favor of the constitutionality of such pro-
hibitions. Significant portions of the opinion are as follows:
"Under a liberalized construction of the general welfare pur-
poses of State and Federal Constitutions there is a trend in the
modem decisions (which we approve) to foster, under the police
power, an aesthetic and cultural side of municipal development-
to prevent a thing that offends the, sense of sight in the same
manner as a thing that offends the senses of hearing and smel-
ling. [Citing cases] But this trend must be kept within reason-
able limitations, for citizens must not be compelled under the
police power to give up rights in property solely for the attain-
ment of aesthetic objects .... and under the law as it exists today
aesthetic or artistic considerations alone are not considered
sufficient to warrant the exercise of the police power to prohibit
advertising billboards generally throughout the city, because
such considerations of themselves are not such a necessity as
justifies the taking of private property without compensation.
"But aesthetic considerations enter in to a great extent, as an
auxiliary consideration where the regulation has a real or reason-
able relation to the safety, health, morals, or general welfare,...
and where a regulation of billboards does not apply to an entire
city, but merely applies to billboards in close proximity to public
parks and boulevards it may properly have a relation to the pub-
lic health, comfort and welfare which it would not otherwise
possess....
1'172 N. E. 309 (Ind. 193o), commented on in N. Y. L. J., Nov. 5, 193o, at
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"Whether an advertising billboard is a disfigurement or a
desirable addition to a community depends upon the character
of the surroundings in the community as well as upon the bill-
board advertising itself. But the determination of such a ques-
tion and the determination of what regulations or what prohi-
bitions within certain areas there shall be of billboards under the
police power is (subject to the limitations hereinbefore stated)
for the legislative body of the city...
"As social relations become more complex, restrictions on in-
dividual rights become more common. Restrictions which years
ago would have been deemed intolerable and in violation of the
property owners' constitutional rights are now desirable and
necessary, and zoning ordinances fair in their requirements are
usually sustained. . . . A zoning law (sections 10372-10380,
Burns' 1926) and ordinances enacted thereunder have been in
effect in this State and in municipalities thereof for eight or
nine years, and their constitutional validity has never been
questioned in this court. Under laws and ordinances of this
character many regulations and limitations of structural design
and property use have been upheld which bear no closer relation
to the public safety, health, morals, and general welfare, or
public comfort, convenience and prosperity (which latter terms
are also included in the recent cases...) than does the ordinance
concerning billboards in the instant case .... 117
Attention should also be invited, in passing, to the well-reasoned
opinion of Mr. Justice Trent in the Philippine case of Churchill v.
Rafferty, 18 which involved a statute taxing billboards and giving to
the Collector of Internal Revenue the power summarily to remove
any sign or billboard exposed to public view which, after investi-
gation, he decided was "offensive to the sight or otherwise a nuisance."
Section 5 of the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902, which may be con-
sideredin the nature of its constitution, contains the usual prohibition
against laws which deprive "any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal
protection of the laws."'u 9 In sustaining the statute the court, by
Mr. Justice Trent, remarked that the eye is equally entitled to pro-
tection with the nose and the ear and said:
"Without entering into the realm of psychology, we think
it quite demonstrable that sight is as valuable to a human being
as any of his other senses, and that the proper ministration to
this sense conduces as much to his contentment as the care be-
stowed upon the senses of hearing or smell, and probably as
n7Tbid. 312, 313.
11832 Philippine 580 (1915). Appeal dismissed 248 U. S. 591, 39 Sup. Ct. 20
(x918). See also (1928) 17 CALIF. L. REV. 120, 214.
11932 STAT. 691 (1902), reenacted in 39 STAT. 546 (1916), 48 U. S. C. A. § loo8
(1928).
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much as both together. Objects may be offensive to the eye as
well as to the nose or ear.'1
20
Referring to the decisions which hold that the police power may
not be exercised for purely aesthetic purposes, the court said:
"The courts, taking this view, rest their decisions upon the
proposition that the esthetic sense is disassociated entirely from
any relation to the public health, morals, comfort, or general
welfare and is, therefore, beyond the police power of the state.
But we are of the opinion, as above indicated, that unsightly
advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are
offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general wel-
fare of the public.. This is not establishing a new principle, but
carrying a well recognized principle to further application.' 2'
That the problem of the regulation of billboards as such is not easy
of solution admits of little doubt. The line between what is objection-
able and what is not objectionable in signs and billboards is, perhaps,
difficult to draw. It is not likely that reasonable men would differ as
to the noises, which are of such volume and such objectionable
qualities as to warrant their being restrained, nor is it likely that
there would be much difference of opinion as to the odors which
should be prohibited. On the other hand, reasonable men differ
widely as to what is attractive and what is ugly, and unless the
erection and maintenance of billboards can constitutionally be pro-
hibited entirely, it may be necessary that regulations 'restricting
the erection and maintenance of signs and billboards throughout the
country-side should lay down some basis by which it could be deter-
mined whether or not a given billboard in a given locality would con-
stitute a violation of the restriction.
But, as we have attempted to show, the tendency in our courts is
to recognize the elasticity of the police power. "The heresy of today
is the religion of tomorrow." If the people of this country, speaking
through their governing bodies, ordain that esthetic considerations
require the restriction and regulation of the billboard nuisance
throughout the country-side, the courts will undoubtedly make
every effort to sustain such enactments. The courts may even dis-
card the rule that legislation based solely on esthetic considerations
is unconstitutional. They may sustain such enactments on the theory
that the police power extends to the protection of the "comfort,"
"peace" and "convenience" of the public.
It is more likely, however, that they will seek some "practical"
peg on which to hang such legislation. The practical peg may be
'
2 0Churchill v. Rafferty, supra note 118, at 608.
121Ibid. 61 1.
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slim in importance, as, for example, the argument that every bill-
board within sight of a public highway tends to distract the attention
of the motorist and is, consequently, a potential source of danger to
traffic. It might be pointed out that the eradication of billboards
would improve the appearance of property and thus enhance its value,
or that in sections of the country which enjoy a large income from
tourist traffic, the uncommercialized appearance of the landscape
would attract tourists and augment the income of the populace from
this source. But, however fragile the "peg", as Mr. Justice Angell
succinctly states in People v. Sterling:
"We have reached a point in the development of the police
power where an esthetic purpose needs but little assistance
from a practical one in order to withstand an attack on consti-
tutional grounds."1
rePeople v. Sterling, supra note 41, at 653, 220 N. Y. Supp. at 318.
